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Abstract
In this thesis, we propose a novel secure key agreement protocol that uses biometrics
with unordered set of features. Our protocol enables the user and the server to agree
on a symmetric key, which is generated by utilizing only the feature points of the user’s
biometrics. It means that our protocol does not generate the key randomly or it does
not use any random data in the key itself. As a proof of concept, we instantiate our
protocol model using fingerprints. In our protocol, we employ a threshold-based quan-
tization mechanism, in order to group the minutiae in a predefined neighborhood. In
this way, we increase the chance of user-server agreement on the same set of minutiae.
Our protocol works in rounds. In each round, depending on the calculated similar-
ity score on the common set of minutiae, the acceptance/rejection decision is made.
Besides, we employ multi-criteria security analyses for our proposed protocol. These
security analyses show that the generated keys possess acceptable randomness accord-
ing to Shannon’s entropy. In addition, the keys, which are generated after each protocol
run, are indistinguishable from each other, as measured by the Hamming distance met-
ric. Our protocol is also robust against brute-force, replay and impersonation attacks,
proven by high attack complexity and low equal error rates. At the end, the complexity
analysis and the memory requirements of the protocol are discussed and it is showed
that they are in acceptable limits. As shown by comparative analyses, this work out-
performs the existing fuzzy vault method in terms of verification performance and the
attack complexity.
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Saf Biyometrik Kullanımıyla Gu¨venli Anahtar Anlas¸ması
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O¨zet
Bu c¸alıs¸mada, o¨zellik noktaları sırasız eleman dizilerinden olus¸an biyometriklerin kul-
lanımı ile gu¨venli anahtar mutabakatı protokolu¨ tasarlanmıs¸tır. O¨nerilen protokol,
servis sag˘layıcı ile kullanıcının yalnızca biyometrik o¨zellik noktalarını kullanarak simetrik
bir anahtar olus¸turmalarını sag˘lamaktadır. Dig˘er bir deyis¸le, protokol anahtarı rast-
gele olus¸turmamakta veya anahtar olus¸turma su¨recinde hic¸bir rastgele veriden yarar-
lanmamaktadır. O¨nerilen yo¨ntemin kuram ispatı olarak, bu protokol modeli parmak
izi kullanılarak gerc¸eklenmis¸tir. Protokolde es¸ik tabanlı nicemleme kullanılarak be-
lirli bir koms¸uluk ilis¸kisi ic¸erisindeki o¨zellik noktaları gruplanmıs¸lardır. Bu sayede,
servis sag˘layıcı ile kullanıcı arasında ortak o¨zellik noktaları u¨zerinde anlas¸ılması ihtimali
artırılmıs¸tır. Protokol rauntlar halinde c¸alıs¸maktadır. Her rauntta ortak bulunan o¨zel-
lik noktası sayısı kullanılarak bir benzerlik skoru hesaplanmakta ve bu skora go¨re kul-
lanıcının sisteme kabul/ret kararı verilmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, c¸oklu deg˘erlendirme
o¨lc¸u¨tleri kullanılarak gu¨venlik analizleri yapılmıs¸tır. Gu¨venlik analizleri, olus¸turulan
anahtarların rastgelelik oranlarının Shannon’un entropisi metrig˘ine go¨re gu¨venli seviye-
lerde oldug˘unu go¨stermis¸tir. Ayrıca protokolu¨n sonunda olus¸turulan tu¨m anahtarların
birbirlerine benzer olmadıkları Hamming uzaklık metrig˘i ile go¨sterilmis¸tir. O¨te yandan
protokolu¨n, kaba kuvvet saldırısı, tekrarlama ve taklit etme ataklarına kars¸ı dayanıklı
oldug˘u yu¨ksek atak zorlug˘u ve du¨s¸u¨k hata oranları ile kanıtlanmıs¸tır. Protokolu¨n
v
karmas¸ıklıg˘ının ve hafıza gereksinimlerinin sistemin gerc¸eklenmesine uygun oldug˘u ra-
porlanmıs¸tır. Son olarak, protokol ile literatu¨rde var olan bir yo¨ntemin kars¸ılas¸tırılması
ile, protokolu¨n performans ve atak dayanıklılıg˘ı ac¸ısından daha bas¸arılı oldug˘u go¨ste-
rilmis¸tir.
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1 Introduction
In generic cryptographic applications, unique and user-specific secret keys are used.
However, these keys can be stolen, lost or willingly shared. On the other hand, bio-
metric traits are used to identify or verify users, since they are strictly bound to the
user. The reason behind this is that the biometric traits are unique physiological or be-
havioral characteristics of individuals. In order to provide higher security and privacy,
biometrics and cryptography are combined as this combination provides the binding of
user’s personal characteristics to cryptographic keys. The combination of biometrics
and cryptography is referred to as crypto-biometric or bio-cryptographic systems. This
way, the secret keys, which are used for encryption and decryption in cryptographic
applications, are derived from the biometric data with the help of their unique features.
The key used in a cryptographic application must be secure. A secure key must
be random enough, contain sufficient entropy and be distinct from each other. Addi-
tionally, the length of the key must be long enough for not being guessed simply by
trying all possibilities. Due to the invariant nature of the biometrics, satisfying the
requirements of a secure key derived from the biometrics is a challenging task in bio-
cryptographic systems. In addition, the main problem in bio-cryptographic approaches
is that the cryptographic applications require exactly the same keys in encryption and
decryption operations, whereas in biometric applications, such an exact match is not
needed. This difference in their approaches should also be considered while designing
bio-cryptographic systems.
Each biometric data has its own distinctive features. These features can be repre-
sented with either ordered or unordered sets. Ordered sets are typically binary strings.
Iris is an example of a biometric with ordered features, as iris code is a binary string
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retrieved from the unrolled iris texture. On the other hand, unordered sets are gener-
ally a list of points on a coordinate system with insignificant orders. Biometric features
from which independent points can be extracted are examples of unordered feature sets,
such as fingerprints.
1.1 Our Contribution Summary
In this thesis, we propose a novel biometric key agreement protocol that uses un-
ordered set of features. As an example, we implement and evaluate our protocol using
fingerprints, which are represented with unordered set of minutiae points. Our protocol
generates the keys by using only the minutiae points, without any other helper com-
ponent. In this key agreement protocol, hash functions and threshold mechanisms are
employed. Moreover, in order to hide the genuine minutiae points, fake minutiae points
are generated according to a strategy. This strategy is developed to properly manage
the trade-off between information leakage to the attacker and acceptable verification
results. For this reason, a distance threshold and a neighborhood relation are defined
such that there cannot be more than one point (genuine and/or fake) in a pre-defined
distance neighborhood. This process is analogous to quantization. Thus, in the rest of
the thesis, we will call this method as quantization.
Our key agreement protocol runs in a round-manner such that at each round, the
user and the server tries to find a common set of minutiae points. At the end of the
protocol, either the user is rejected, due to the reason that the similarity score is below
the acceptance threshold, or the user and the server agree on a secure symmetric key.
We analysed the security performance of our system from different perspectives.
From biometrics point of view, our model shows high verification performance, proven
by low Equal Error Rates (EER). We also analysed the resistance of our protocol against
some known attacks, such as brute-force, replay and impersonation attacks. Moreover,
the quality of the agreed keys is analysed in terms of randomness and distinctiveness.
These analyses show that our system is quite resistant to these attacks; the generated
keys are random enough to be used as cryptographic keys; and each key is distinct from
the other agreed keys. It is also important to note that this protocol generates different
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keys after each protocol run using a time invariant biometric data. In addition, we
report the complexity and the memory requirements analyses of our protocol and show
that they are suitable for real time applications. Finally, we compare our protocol with
an existing key binding method, called fuzzy vault [1], and show that our protocol out-
performs this method in terms of performance and attack complexity. The preliminary
results of this thesis are presented in [2].
1.2 Outline of Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 gives background information
and Section 3 summarizes the related work in the literature. In Section 4, we introduce
our proposed secure key agreement protocol. Section 5 evaluates the performance of our
proposed protocol, discusses its security, complexity and memory requirement analyses,
as well as providing comparison results with an existing method. Finally, in Section 6
we conclude the thesis and provide some future works.
3
2 Background Work
Firstly, this section briefly discusses biometrics and cryptography. After the security
mechanisms, which are used in this work, are shortly explained, the details of the
combination of biometrics and cryptography are mentioned in this section.
2.1 Biometrics
Identifying or verifying people can be done in different ways. Human brain can
recognize people by looking at their faces or by hearing their voices. However, in an
automatic world, automatic recognition of people by using biometrics is gaining more
and more importance and interest. In [3], biometric systems are defined as automated
methods of identity verification of a person based on their distinctive physiological char-
acteristics, like fingerprint, iris or face, or their distinctive behavioral characteristics,
like signature, voice or keystroke dynamics.
There are two types of biometric systems, namely verification and identification.
If a person claim to have an identity, the verification system checks the correctness of
this claim. In other words, a single match is performed in order to authenticate the
user. Verification systems are needed mostly in credit card and banking transactions,
network logins and cellular phones. On the other hand, in an identification system, the
personal biometric characteristic is presented and the system tries to find this particular
person’s identity in a set of characteristics. Identification systems are mostly used in
criminal investigations and border controls. The biometric verification is a more difficult
task than the biometric identification, since it requires a database search, instead of a
single match. Above all else, in order to run an identification or a verification process,
firstly the person should be enrolled to the system. At the enrollment stage, distinctive
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features of the biometric trait are extracted and stored in the system’s database. After
that, the person can use the application by proving the identity at the verification or
identification stage. In both of these processes, an algorithm or a function is applied to
the existing and the query templates, and their similarity is measured. If they are close
enough, in other words, if their difference is below a threshold, the user is expected to
be identified or verified.
As also mentioned above, biometrics can be physiological or behavioral characteris-
tics of a person. Figure 1 shows some examples of these characteristics. Their usage in
biometric identification and/or verification systems along with their strong and weak
aspects are summarized in [4]. As an example of physiological characteristics, finger-
prints are represented with detail points on the ridges, called minutiae. Fingerprints
are the most commonly employed biometric data, because they have been used by po-
lice to recognize criminals from far in the past. Hence, people are more familiar to it.
Iris is represented using iris code, which is a binary string that shows the patterns on
the iris. Although, iris patterns are more detailed than fingerprints, establishing a per-
fect acquisition environment is a bit harder for iris than fingerprint scanning. Besides,
faces are the mostly used recognition traits of human brains. Digital system recognizes
the faces by the relative positions, sizes and shapes of the features. Therefore, face
recognition is very sensitive to changes, such as head position, expressions and facial
hair. Hand geometry builds a three dimensional template of the hand. But a hand
geometry biometric system can be faked by a fabricated hand and is not very distinc-
tive among people. As an alternative to the physiological characteristics, the behavioral
characteristics are easier to capture. Signature dynamic is an example of the behavioral
characteristic, which is needed mostly in financial applications, in order to automate
the signature verification process. Besides, voice can be recorded using a regular device,
and after that the waveforms of the voice are used in the recognition process. Although
the voice can be imitated, the characteristics of speech involves some physiological as-
pects as well, and they are almost impossible to impersonate. Keystroke dynamics are
very easy to capture from the keyboard. Its verification process does not disturb the
person to be identified, because it is hidden in the regular flow of an application.
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Biometrics
Physiological
characteristics
Behavioral
characteristics
Fingerprint
Iris
Face
Hand
Signature
Voice
Keystroke
Figure 1: Biometric data types
The main difference between physiological and behavioral traits is their persistence.
Physiological characteristics are more stable than the behavioral ones. They stay almost
the same throughout a person’s life, unless getting an injury. On the other hand, be-
havioral characteristics change over time, due to both controllable and uncontrollable
reasons, such as emotions, neurological diseases, hoarseness, etc. Therefore, biomet-
ric systems which use behavioral characteristics update their template after each use.
Hence, behavioral biometric systems work better when they are used frequently [3].
The systems that use physiological characteristics perform better than behavioral ones
in terms of permanence, universality, distinctiveness and performance [5]. On the other
hand, behavioral characteristics are easier to collect and people are more willing to use
them [5]. As a result, while designing a biometric recognition system, the type of the
biometric data to be used and the system requirements should be considered seriously.
Any biometric system should satisfy some requirements as mentioned in [3, 6, 7].
While designing a biometric system, apart from the type of the characteristics, the
privacy of the biometric data should be deliberated. The biometric trait should be kept
secret and used only for the intended purpose. In addition, it should be easy to use and
should not bother people while capturing the biometric data. In terms of accuracy, the
system should accept all authorized people, while rejecting all impostors even in large
databases. Besides, the timing and memory costs should be small. The queries should
be processed quickly without causing delay in real-time applications. The templates
should have acceptable sizes even in very large databases of millions of people.
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2.2 Cryptography
People need privacy, security and trust in all aspects of life. Especially, in digital
world, the number of transactions, interactions and the size of personal data are growing
very fast. At the same time, the need for privacy, security and trust is becoming more
and more important. Not only today, even thousands of years ago, emperors had to
establish secure communication channels between themselves, governmental officials
and commandants for success. Moreover, they had to protect their sensitive, secret
and strategic messages against the enemies. In order to prevent their messages to
be read by adversaries, the cipherment techniques were developed, such that only the
authorized receivers can read those messages [8]. Nearly 4000 years ago, in ancient
Egypt, the recorded history of cryptology was started [9]. Symbol substitutions were
found on the remains of the hieroglyphs. Additionally, Julius Caesar was one of the
emperors who had used a cipher method which has been named after him [10]. While
the national officers were trying to find out the best methods to hide their messages, the
cryptanalysts were trying to break the ciphers. If a code was broken, the officers had
to find a new and stronger cryptographic technique to hide their messages. Although
the communicating entities have changed a little nowadays, this progress is still almost
the same and conduces to the advances in cryptography. It was an art in ancient times;
however, now it is a science [11].
In a general cryptographic model, the building blocks are as follows: plaintext, en-
cryption algorithm, secret key, ciphertext and decryption algorithm [12, 13]. Plaintext
is the original message in clear text. Encryption algorithm is mostly a mathematical
function that transforms plaintext into unintelligible form. Plaintext and the secret key
are the inputs of the encryption algorithm. Secret key is a value, using which the en-
cryption algorithm performs the transformations. Secret key is selected independently
of the plaintext and the encryption algorithm. Ciphertext is the output of the encryp-
tion algorithm. It is a random looking, unintelligible data which is produced depending
on the plaintext and the key. Even two exactly the same plaintexts produce different
ciphertexts with different keys. Besides, two different plaintexts are converted into two
different ciphertexts even with the same keys. Decryption algorithm is the reverse of
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the encryption algorithm. Its task is the regeneration of the original plaintext using the
ciphertext and the key. In Figure 2, the general flow of a secure communication is visu-
alized. In this figure, there are two subjects, Alice and Bob, who want to communicate
with each other. Their personal messages should be protected against unauthorized
accesses. Therefore, Alice uses an encryption algorithm that transforms her plaintext
into the ciphertext. Since the channel is not secure, interceptors and eavesdroppers can
capture the ciphertext, but the content does not make sense to them without the secret
key. At the receiver side, Bob decrypts the ciphertext using the secret key and can read
the original message.
Alice BobEncrypt Decrypt
Key Key
Plaintext Plaintext
Channel
Ciphertext Ciphertext
Figure 2: General flow of a secure communication
Cryptosystems should provide many functionalities, such as confidentiality, authen-
tication, integrity and non-repudiation [12, 13]. Confidentiality means hiding the con-
tent of the message transmitted. It protects the message from unauthorized access.
This functionality is ensured by encrypting the data. Authentication means that the
owner of the message is the correct entity. The authorized entity is the one that is
verified and trusted. In addition, by the integrity, it is provided that the messages
cannot be modified by unauthorized parties. It is for sure that the received message
is as exactly the same as the sent message; no modification, no insertion, no deletion.
Non-repudiation provides that none of the communicating entities can deny any of the
transactions they made.
Cryptographic systems are classified according to three different characteristics:
(i) the transformation method used in the encryption algorithm, (ii) the way in which
the transformation is applied, and (iii) the number of keys [12]. The transformation
method could be substitution and/or transposition. In the substitution method, each
element of the plaintext is mapped into a different element. On the other hand, in the
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transposition method, the position of each element in the plaintext is changed. These
methods can be used individually or together in an encryption algorithm. The impor-
tant issue which must be considered here is that the transformation must be reversible
without any loss of information. Moreover, the plaintext elements can be transformed
into the ciphertext elements either one by one or block by block. If they are processed
one by one, this system is called as a stream cipher. However, if the elements are pro-
cessed as blocks, then the system is a block cipher. In terms of the number of keys,
there are single or two keyed systems. In a single keyed system, the key is known
by both the sender and the receiver, and the keys are identical in both ends of the
communication. This type of systems is named as symmetric key encryptions. In a
two keyed system, encryption and decryption are done using different keys. They are
referred to as asymmetric key encryptions. Since our work provides that the sender and
the receiver agree on a private key, which can further be used in a symmetric key en-
cryption algorithm, only the symmetric key cryptography is explained in the following
subsection. After that, the mechanisms and examples of hash functions are discussed
in the next subsection, since the work proposed in this thesis makes use of the hash
functions.
2.2.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
All of the classical cryptosystems were symmetric [10]. In symmetric key cryptog-
raphy, encryption and decryption keys are the same and known to both of the commu-
nicating entities. Therefore, symmetric key cryptography is also referred to as private
key, single key or secret key cryptography. It is also named as conventional encryption.
One of the most important hypotheses in cryptography, which is known as Kerckhoffs’s
principle, was stated by Auguste Kerckhoffs in 1883 [10]. He stated that the security of
a cryptosystem is not built upon the secrecy of the encryption methods being used; only
the key is the secret. Due to the fact that the encryption/decryption algorithms are
public and the keys are the same, in a symmetric key cryptography setting, the security
of the system depends only on the strength of the encryption algorithm and the secrecy
of the symmetric keys. The encryption algorithm should be strong enough not to allow
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an attacker to figure out the secret key, even if the attacker has access to many cipher-
texts and their corresponding plaintexts. The possibility of having public algorithms
for the symmetric key cryptography makes it practical to be used commonly [12].
The communication flow which is shown in Figure 2 exemplifies a usage of private
key cryptographic algorithm, because the keys are identical. However, the main problem
in such systems is the randomness (unpredictability) of the utilized keys and the key
management. Actually, the most fundamental problem in cryptography is the secure key
exchange and maintenance, as explained in [14]. The details, weak and strong aspects
of generic key management techniques are explained in the following paragraph.
Key Management in Symmetric Key Cryptography In an automated world,
the communicating entities should agree on the same symmetric keys without physically
being together and without compromising future communication. In addition, the keys
should be updated frequently, in order to limit the compromised information, if a key is
learned by an attacker [13]. Key management refers to the establishment, distribution
or agreement of the secret keys [12, 14]. Key establishment is a process at the end
of which a secret is shared among the communicating entities. A key establishment
process can be a distribution or an agreement. In a key distribution scheme, one of the
entities selects a secret key, and transmits this key to the other entity in a secure way.
If the key is generated at the sender side, it should be sent to the destination through
a secure channel. If this is not the case, a third party can generate and deliver the key
to both of the communicating parties. However, assuming a secure channel between
the parties is not realistic in digital world. On the other hand, key agreement is a
mechanism in which a shared secret is derived by the both ends of the communication
as a result of a function or a sequence of steps taken in a protocol. This kind of a
protocol should be carefully designed not to leak information to the attacker. In a key
agreement process, none of the entities know the key before the process starts. To sum
up, a secure and efficient key management is the most crucial aspect of the symmetric
key cryptography.
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This thesis proposes a secure key agreement protocol between the server and the
user. In this protocol, the communicating parties agree on the common parts of a
biometric data and generate the secret key using only those shared biometric features.
2.2.2 Hash Functions
A hash function is defined as a function whose input is an arbitrary-length message
and whose output is a fixed length digest [12]. Digest can be referred to as hash code,
hash value or shortly hash. The abbreviation of the hash functions h = H(M) means
that the hash function H is applied to the message M and the output h is produced.
Basically, applying a hash function to a message is like applying a compression function
to it several times.
A hash function has to satisfy some requirements which are listed in [10, 12–14].
Firstly, applying the hash function to a large set of inputs should produce uniformly
distributed random outputs. Secondly, a single bit change in the input should result
in the change of the output completely. Additionally, a cryptographic hash function
which is used in security applications should have some more features. A cryptographic
hash function must have the one-way property. In other words, calculation of a digest
should be easy and quick, whereas it must be computationally infeasible to revert back
from the hash value to the original message. Further, a cryptographic hash function
must be collision-free. In a weak collision resistance, given a message M , it must be
computationally infeasible to find a different message M
′
whose hash values are the
same. In terms of a strong collision resistance, it must be computationally infeasible to
find any two different messages whose hash values are the same. Due to these properties,
hash functions are mostly used in applications in which the data integrity should be
guaranteed. Additionally, hash functions are used for confirmation of knowledge, key
derivation and pseudorandom number generation [14]. In the following paragraphs, two
hash methods which are used in this work will be explained.
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Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) SHA was proposed by National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) in 1993 [10]. It is a function of modular arithmetic and
logical binary operations. This version is known as SHA-0. After some weaknesses were
found in this algorithm, a new standard, SHA-1, was proposed in 1995 [15]. However,
this was not the last. NIST produced a new version of the standard which defines three
new versions of SHA [16]. These three versions are known as SHA-2 family of hash
functions. In 2005, NIST requested to terminate approval of SHA-1 until 2010. SHA-2
is a standardized hash algorithm since 2005 [12].
One version of SHA-2 functions is SHA-256, and this version is used in this work as
the specific hash function. SHA-256 is a hash function which produces 256 bit outputs
(hash values). The security of the SHA-2 family functions is proved in [17].
Keyed Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) Hash-based mes-
sage authentication codes (MAC) were used extensively with the symmetric encryption
techniques. However, cryptographic hash functions run generally faster than the sym-
metric encryption algorithms [12]. Therefore, keyed hash functions were developed to
satisfy the need of a fast hash-based MAC. The mostly known and supported algorithm
of such is the HMAC [18]. It is a keyed hash function which is generally used between
two parties, if they share a secret key and want to ensure the data authentication and
integrity. Any hash function can be embedded to the HMAC algorithm. In this work,
we use SHA-256-based HMAC implementation.
2.3 Combining Biometrics and Cryptography: Bio-cryptography
In order to establish trust in a communication, we need cryptographic primitives.
On the other hand, we need biometrics to link the user with the application for au-
thentication. For these reasons, researchers combine biometrics with cryptography as
this combination provides effective and complementary solutions to data security from
different aspects. The combination of cryptography and biometrics is named as bio-
cryptography or crypto-biometrics.
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Since the world becomes more and more automated and digital, remote and au-
tomatic recognition systems are needed in many areas such as banking, government,
military, healthcare and security agencies. Although smart cards, passwords and PINs
(Personal Identification Number) are used for the aim of automatic recognition and au-
thentication, this kind of a system can be fooled easily. Some passwords are very simple
and can be guessed or broken. Besides, complex passwords are hard to remember, and
in this case people tend to note down their passwords. This situation also creates a
security threat [4, 5]. Biometric recognition systems solve the problem of automated
personal identification; they are more difficult to cheat and they simplify the recogni-
tion process [3–5]. In addition, due to the fact that biometrics cannot be lost, copied
and shared, a biometric recognition system is more reliable than a password-based sys-
tem [6]. In terms of security, the biometric authentication systems are equivalent to
using a long password, whereas it is as simple as a short password system [19].
Bio-cryptographic approaches are mostly related to the key management. In other
words, researchers propose methods to combine biometrics with cryptographic keys. As
it is addressed in [20,21], the main difficulty of using a biometric in a key management
process is the noisy nature of the biometrics. In a general biometric system, a partial
match above a threshold is acceptable. However, in a cryptographic system, the keys
must be identical. Therefore, the researches who are willing to work on this area must
design methods to handle this difficulty. There are many works in the literature which
are related to the key management using irises, fingerprints, keystroke dynamics and
voices. For example, in [22], the authors describe a method to generate a cryptographic
key from the iris biometrics. This system uses the passwords as well, but with the help
of biometrics, the entropy of the keys increases significantly. [23] introduces a fingerprint
based key locking technique. In this technique, the authors locks a random key into
the phase information retrieved from the fingerprint image. In addition, in [24], the
authors propose a method to harden passwords using the keystroke dynamics of each
particular user. A scheme of cryptographic key generation from voice while the user is
speaking a password is presented in [25].
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While designing a bio-cryptographic application, there are number of constraints
that should be taken into consideration. Firstly, the error rates of the system should be
reasonable. Secondly, the system should deal with the irrevocability of the biometrics,
because a compromised biometric cannot be changed. In addition, since the biometrics
is not time varying, template protection and the key diversity should be accomplished.
Finally, the length and the randomness of the keys are also very important issues in a
secure system.
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3 Related Work and Problem Statement
In this section, related work in the literature is discussed and the problem statement
of this work is also mentioned.
3.1 Related Work
Bio-cryptographic systems are threefold: (i) key release, (ii) key generation and
(iii) key binding. In [4, 5] and [26], the authors describe these bio-cryptographic meth-
ods and discuss their problems. In key release mechanism, firstly a biometric authen-
tication process is run. In this process, the input biometric template is compared with
the one in the system database. If the matching is successful, a key is released. How-
ever, the fact that the user authentication and key release are independent processes
is a disadvantage of this mechanism. The key and the user biometric are not strictly
bound to each other. On the other hand, in key generation or key binding mechanisms,
biometrics and cryptography are integrated; a cryptographic key is bound to the bio-
metric data of the user. In these methods, neither the biometric template, nor the
cryptographic key is accessible to the attacker. The correct cryptographic key could
only be generated when a valid biometric template is presented by the user. Biometric
matching is not performed, because when the correct key cannot be generated from the
biometric template, the decryption function fails and the user is rejected automatically.
The reason behind this is that cryptographic encryption/decryption functions require
exactly the same key.
The main issue in biometric key generation or key binding methods is the variance
of biometric template. Due to variations in biometrics, if one bit of the generated key
is different than that of the correct one, the genuine user may be rejected. In order
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to avoid these false rejects, fuzzy key binding methods are proposed, namely fuzzy
commitment and fuzzy vault. The fuzzy commitment scheme was proposed by Juels
and Wattenberg [27]. In this scheme, the user selects a secret word W . The difference
(XOR) between the user’s biometric template X and the codeword W is denoted as d.
The difference vector d and the hash of the secret word y = H(W ) together constitute
the encrypted message. At the verification stage, the user provides a query biometric
Y . The difference between Y and d is W
′
, and y is used to check the correctness of
the extracted W
′
. This scheme is applicable to be used with ordered set of features,
such as iris code. In [28], the authors propose a mechanism to obtain cryptographic
keys from iris codes using fuzzy commitment, which is based on the method described
in [21]. However, [29] and [30] show that the fuzzy commitment methods are vulnerable,
because the attacker can reconstruct not only the key but also the iris code by making
use of the error correction codes and statistical attacks.
The fuzzy vault scheme is proposed by Juels and Sudan [1]. In contrast to the fuzzy
commitment scheme, the fuzzy vault scheme is applied to the unordered set of features,
such as minutiae in fingerprints. In this method, a secret word W is mapped to the
coefficients of a polynomial P (x). This polynomial is evaluated on the feature points of
the biometric template. In addition to the evaluated points (x, P (x)), a large number
of chaff points that do not lie on the polynomial are generated. These genuine and
chaff points are mixed and the total set is named as the vault. In the verification stage,
the user provides a query template, and with the help of this template, genuine points
are determined. Using Lagrange Interpolation, the polynomial P (x) is reconstructed
and its coefficients are mapped to the secret W
′
. With the use of error correction
codes, the correct secret W is obtained. In [31] and [32], fingerprint-based fuzzy vault
methods are presented. However, it is proven that the fuzzy vault is also vulnerable to
some known attacks; such as brute-force [33], stolen-key inversion [34] and correlation
based attacks [35]. Although in [36], the authors improve fuzzy vault for fingerprint
verification, they still leak some information to the attacker by inserting chaff points
into the vault that are close to each other but away from the genuine points. With
this strategy, the attacker can make sure that if there are two points which are close
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enough to each other and if it is known that one of these points is chaff, the other point
is definitely a chaff point.
3.2 Problem Statement
The existing key release, key generation and key binding methods do not address
the issue of key establishment purely from the biometrics without using random data.
In both of the fuzzy commitment and the fuzzy vault mechanisms, the secret word is
selected by the user or it is randomly generated. In other words, the secret word is not
derived directly from the biometric template. On the contrary, the biometric template
is used as a component to hide the secret word. In contrast to all of these methods,
in this thesis, the secret word (key) is directly generated from the feature points of the
biometric template. In addition, from a timely invariant biometric, generating many
different keys is a challenging task which is also achieved in this work.
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4 Proposed Secure Key Agreement Protocol using
Pure Biometrics
In this section we describe our proposed secure key agreement protocol, which uses
fingerprint biometrics without any other type of helper data. The definitions of the
symbols used in the protocol definition are given in Table 1. Our key agreement protocol
can be divided into two phases: (i) enrollment and (ii) verification, each of which is
explained in the following subsections.
4.1 Enrollment Phase
The enrollment is performed only at the server side and the corresponding template
generation algorithm is given in Algorithm 1. At the enrollment stage, the user provides
three fingerprint images, FP1, FP2, FP3, of the same finger. Then, the minutiae of
these fingerprints are extracted. Each minutia is represented with three attributes:
x-coordinate, y-coordinate and type. The type of a minutia can be end or bifurcation.
End type of a minutia indicates a ridge ending. On the other hand, if the ridge branches
into two, the branching point is a bifurcation type of a minutia. The minutiae list of a
fingerprint image constitutes the template of this particular fingerprint image. While
generating the template, we quantize the minutiae by selecting representatives from
the groups that are determined by the predefined distance threshold, Tdist. In this
quantization step, the minutiae which are at most Tdist-away to any other minutia with
the same type are mapped to one minutia by picking the one with the smallest y-
coordinate value. After that, the server puts these fingerprint templates on top of each
other, in order to find out the most reliable minutiae. The minutiae which are present in
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at least two out of three fingerprint templates are considered as reliable minutiae. Only
the reliable minutiae are kept in the final template. For the reason that the minutiae are
close to each other more than Tdist are considered as one minutia, a Tdist-neighborhood
relation is defined as follows: All of the points in the coordinate system which have
x-coordinate in [xj − Tdist, xj + Tdist] and y-coordinate in [yj − Tdist, yj + Tdist] are the
neighbors of the minutia with (xj, yj) in the Tdist-neighborhood. This neighborhood
relation is exemplified in Figure 3, where the original minutia is located at (49, 91) and
Tdist is 2.
47, 89 47, 90 47, 91 47, 92 47, 93
48, 89 48, 90 48, 91 48, 92 48, 93
49, 89 49, 90 49,91 49, 92 49, 93
50, 89 50, 90 50, 91 50, 92 50, 93
51, 89 51, 90 51, 91 51, 92 51, 93
Figure 3: Neighborhood relation when Tdist = 2
Thereafter, x-coordinate, y-coordinate and type of each minutia point and its neigh-
bors in Tdist-neighborhood together with the type of this particular minutia are concate-
nated and hashed one by one as H1(x||y||type). These hashes constitute a particular
user’s template in the server. Note that although double hashes will be needed in
the verification stage, storing single hashes is enough, since the double hashes can be
calculated by re-hashing the stored values once again if necessary.
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Table 1: Symbols used in Protocol Definition
Symbol Description
FP Fingerprint
x x-coordinate of a minutia
y y-coordinate of a minutia
type Type of a minutia
nu Total number of genuine minutiae on the user side
ns Total number of genuine minutiae on the server side
ncom Number of common minutiae found by the server
nkeycom Number of minutiae used in the final key agreement
H i(·) Hash function applied i times (i ≥ 1)
Gs Set of genuine minutiae on the server side
Gu Set of genuine minutiae on the user side
C Set of fake minutiae on the user side
Qu
Set of shuﬄed (H2(gu) ∪H2(c))
s.t. gu ∈ Gu & c ∈ C
G′s Set of minutiae ∈ {Qu ∩Gs}
G′′s,j Any subset of G
′
s s.t. |G′′s,j| = |G′s| − j (j ≥ 1)
G′u Any subset of Gu s.t. |G′u| = |G′s|
G′′u,j Any subset of G
′
u s.t. |G′′u,j| = |G′s| − j (j ≥ 1)
S Similarity score
Tsim Acceptance similarity score threshold
Tdist Distance threshold used in neighborhood definition
Ki(us,su)
Ki ith key generated (i ≥ 0)
us by the user to communicate with the server
su by the server to communicate with the user
HMAC(·) Keyed Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [18]
HMACKus(·) HMAC generated using Kus
HMACKsu(·) HMAC generated using Ksu
HMACKisu(·) HMAC generated using Kisu
attc Attack complexity
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Algorithm 1 Template Generation Algorithm
INPUT: FP1, FP2, FP3
OUTPUT: Gs
1: Ginits = ExtractMinutiae(FP1, FP2, FP3)
2: for i = 1 : |Ginits | − 1 do
3: m1 = G
init
s (i)
4: for j = i + 1 : |Ginits | do
5: m2 = G
init
s (j)
6: if m1.x ≥ m2.x− (2 ∗ Tdist) &
7: m1.x ≤ m2.x + (2 ∗ Tdist) &
8: m1.y ≥ m2.y − (2 ∗ Tdist) &
9: m1.y ≤ m2.y + (2 ∗ Tdist) &
10: m1.type == m2.type then
11: m1.visited + +
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: for i = 1 : |Ginits | do
16: if Ginits (i).visited < 2 then
17: Remove ith minutia from Ginits
18: end if
19: end for
20: ind← 1
21: for i = 1 : |Ginits | do
22: m1 = G
init
s (i)
23: for j = (−1) ∗ Tdist : Tdist do
24: for k = (−1) ∗ Tdist : Tdist do
25: Gs(ind) = H
1(m1.x + j||m1.y + k||m1.type)
26: ind← ind + 1
27: end for
28: end for
29: end for
4.2 Verification Phase
At the verification stage, three different fingerprint images of the same finger are
used. As in the enrollment phase, the minutiae points are extracted from these finger-
prints. Similarly, at most Tdist-away minutiae are mapped to one minutia by selecting
the one with the smallest y-coordinate value. After that, three fingerprint templates
are put on top of each other and the most reliable minutiae are selected. In order to
mask the genuine minutiae points at the user side, 10 × |Gu| fake minutiae points are
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generated randomly. Fake minutiae point generation is an important process, since the
fake points should not leak any information to the attacker. For this reason, a fake
point must be indistinguishable from a genuine minutia point from an attacker’s point
of view. Since we make sure that all of the genuine minutiae points are at least Tdist-
away from each other, fake minutiae points must be Tdist-away from all the other points
as well. Therefore, the fake minutiae points must also preserve the Tdist-neighborhood
relation.
After the fake minutiae point generation process ends, each minutia point’s (genuine
and fake) x-coordinate, y-coordinate and type are concatenated. Each value is double
hashed as follows: H2(x||y||type). As the key will be generated using single hashed val-
ues of the genuine minutiae, the user keeps H1(x||y||type) only for the genuine minutiae.
Note that in contrast to the enrollment phase, the points in the Tdist-neighborhood are
neither hashed nor sent to the server.
The protocol flow can be seen in Figure 4. Double hashed points’ list together with
the ID of the user is transmitted to the server. In order to extract the genuine points
from the list, the server compares each point with this particular user’s double hashed
template. Since the server has the neighbor minutiae points as well, if a genuine minutia
of the user is in the Tdist-neighborhood with a minutia in the server side, it is counted
as a common genuine minutia. However, it may or may not be a genuine minutia. Our
protocol provides solutions in the following steps for the cases that fake minutiae are
considered as genuine minutiae.
After the comparison is completed, a similarity score is calculated. There are two
well-known methods to calculate the similarity score of two fingerprints as given in
Equation 1 and Equation 2 [37], where ncom is the number of common minutiae, nu is
the number of genuine minutiae on the user side, ns is the number of genuine minutiae
on the server side.
S =
n2com
nu × ns × 100 (1)
S =
2× ncom
nu + ns
× 100 (2)
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If the calculated score is above a certain acceptance threshold, Tsim, the user is
accepted and the key agreement process starts. In the key agreement process, the
server concatenates single hashes of all common minutiae, H1(g
′
s,i), and everything is
rehashed to generate Ksu, which is the key to be used while communicating with the
user. In order to make sure that the user will generate the same key, the server computes
the HMAC of a predefined message msg using Ksu and transmits this value together
with the number of common found minutiae, |G′s|, to the user.
Upon receiving the message, the user generates a key using one of the possible
subsets of the genuine minutiae whose size is the same as the number of found minutiae
on the server side. If the user can verify the HMAC using this generated key, (s)he
sends a positive acknowledgment to the server. Otherwise, the user generates another
key using another subset, until either the HMAC is verified or all possible subsets are
exhausted. In the case that the HMAC is not verified, RETRY message is transmitted
to the server.
If the protocol continues with the RETRY message, the server computes the sim-
ilarity score using |G′s| − 1 as the number of common minutiae. If the score is above
the acceptance threshold Tsim, the server generates all possible keys using all possible
subsets of the found minutiae, whose size is equal to |G′s|−1. The server then transmits
all of the HMAC values generated using these keys to the user. If the user can verify
any one of these HMAC values using any one of the keys generated with any possible
subset of the genuine minutiae, whose size is equal to |G′s|−1, the user transmits a pos-
itive acknowledgment and the index, i, of the verified HMAC to the server. Otherwise,
another RETRY message is transmitted to the server. In this case, the same process
with |G′s| − 2 is carried out. The protocol stops at the jth step, if either the similarity
score computed using the number |G′s|− j is less than the acceptance threshold, or any
HMAC value is verified by the user. If any HMAC value is verified at the end of this
protocol, the server and the user can agree on a symmetric cryptographic key without
using any non-biometric or random value. On the other hand, if the protocol stops
without generating a symmetric key, it can start from scratch upon request.
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USER SERVER
H2(gu) ∀gu ∈ Gu
H2(c) ∀c ∈ C
Qu = mix(H
2(gu) ∪H2(c))
FOREACH G
′
u ⊂ Gu : |G
′
u| = |G
′
s|
Kus = H
1(
|G′s|f
k=1
H1(g
′
u,k)) ∀g
′
u ∈ G
′
u
IF HMACKsu(msg) == HMACKus(msg)→ ACCEPT
and BREAK
IF NOT ACCEPTED → RETRY
FOREACH G
′′
u,1 ⊂ G
′
u : |G
′′
u,1| = |G
′
s| − 1
Kus = H
1(
|G′s|−1f
k=1
H1(g
′′
u,k)) ∀g
′′
u ∈ G
′′
u,1
IF HMACKisu(msg) == HMACKus(msg) → ACCEPT
and BREAK
IF NOT ACCEPTED → RETRY
FOREACH G
′′
u,j ⊂ G
′
u : |G
′′
u,j | = |G
′
s| − j
Kus = H
1(
|G′s|−jf
k=1
H1(g
′′
u,k)) ∀g
′′
u ∈ G
′′
u,j
IF HMACKisu(msg) == HMACKus(msg) → ACCEPT
and BREAK
IF NOT ACCEPTED → RETRY
G
′
s = Qu ∩Gs
S = |G′s|2/(nu × ns)
IF S < Tsim → REJECT
ELSE
Ksu = H
1(
|G′s|f
k=1
H1(g
′
s,k)) ∀g
′
s ∈ G
′
s
S = (|G′s| − 1)2/(nu × ns)
IF S < Tsim → REJECT
ELSE
FOREACH G
′′
s,1 ⊂ G
′
s : |G
′′
s,1| = |G
′
s| − 1
Kisu = H
1(
|G′s|−1f
k=1
H1(g
′′
s,k)) ∀g
′′
s ∈ G
′′
s,1
S = (|G′s| − j)2/(nu × ns)
IF S < Tsim → REJECT
ELSE
FOREACH G
′′
s,j ⊂ G
′
s : |G
′′
s,j | = |G
′
s| − j
Kisu = H
1(
|G′s|−jf
k=1
H1(g
′′
s,k)) ∀g
′′
s ∈ G
′′
s,j
rrr
userID ||Qu
REJECT
|G′s| ||HMACKsu(msg)
ACCEPT
RETRY
HMACKisu(msg)
REJECT
ACCEPT || i
RETRY
HMACKisu(msg)
REJECT
ACCEPT || i
RETRY
Figure 4: Our proposed secure key agreement protocol
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5 Performance Evaluation
Our proposed protocol is tested with two different datasets. First dataset consists of
30 subjects from Verifinger Sample Database [38], which includes fingerprints scanned
using Cross Match Verifier 300 at 500 ppi [39]. In this dataset, each subject has 8
fingerprint images of the same finger. Second dataset includes 292 fingerprints, which
are scanned using Papilon DS22N at 500 ppi [40]. This dataset is constructed by
collecting fingerprints from volunteers in Sabancı University by TU¨BI˙TAK 114E557
project team. In this dataset, we have 10 impressions of each finger. All fingerprint
images in both datasets are aligned using their intensity values in MATLAB R2015a.
The minutiae of each fingerprint is extracted using the Neurotechnology Biometric
SDK 5.0 Verifinger [38]. First 3 fingerprint images are used to generate the template
on the server side. For the first dataset, the remaining 5 fingerprint images are used
as combinations of 3 at the user side. Hence, each subject is tested
(
5
3
)
= 10 times.
On the other hand, in the second dataset, there are 7 fingerprints reserved for user
side operations, which are employed as combinations of 3. Thus, each subject in this
dataset is tested
(
7
3
)
= 35 times. In addition to the genuine tests, impostor tests are
also carried out. In these impostor tests, each subject’s template is tested against all
other subjects’ queries. The hash function used in the protocol is SHA-256 [16] as
mentioned in Section 2.2.2; hence all of the generated keys are 256 bits long.
In the subsections given below, we introduce the performance evaluation metrics,
discuss the verification results of the system and provide security analyses of the proto-
col, as well as representing the randomness and distinctiveness analyses of the generated
keys. After that, we analyse the complexity and memory requirements of the system.
We conclude the section with comparative analysis of our protocol with fuzzy vault.
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5.1 Performance Metrics and Parameters
In biometric authentication systems, the performance is measured using error rates,
namely False Accept Rate (FAR) and False Reject Rate (FRR). FAR is the percentage of
the impostor subjects who are accepted as genuine users; whereas FRR is the percentage
of the genuine subjects who are rejected. In order to evaluate the performance and
minimize both FAR and FRR at the same time, their intersection point is considered.
This point determines the Equal Error Rate (EER). The lower the EER is, the better
is the performance of the biometric authentication.
In terms of randomness, the mostly known and accepted measure is the Shannon’s
Entropy. This metric was proposed by Claude E. Shannon in 1948 [41]. The entropy
metric measures the randomness (unpredictability) of the strings. The entropy value
of a string is between [0, 1]. The maximum value, 1, indicates perfect randomness. In
this analysis, Shannon’s Entropy values of the keys are calculated using Equation 3, in
which Ki represents the i
th bit of the key and P (·) is the probability function.
H = −
∑
i
P (Ki)log2P (Ki) (3)
Distinctiveness of the keys are measured with the Hamming distance metric. It
was proposed by Richard Hamming in 1950 [42]. Hamming distance is the number
of elements which are different at the same positions of two equal length strings. An
example of the Hamming distance computation is given in Figure 5. Hamming distance
helps to assess how much different is two keys, since we want to establish different keys
after each protocol run. The larger Hamming distance values are, the more different
are the keys.
Figure 5: Hamming distance of two binary strings
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5.2 Verification Results
For each test, a similarity score is calculated as given in Equation 1 and Equation 2
in Section 4.2. The minimum score, the maximum score and the average score of the
system are calculated for each subject. These scores are used as acceptance thresholds
of the system one by one. For each different threshold, the corresponding FAR and
FRR values of the system are calculated. As a result of these operations, the best EER
(the point where FAR = FRR), percentages are obtained when the maximum score of
the system is picked as the acceptance threshold.
For the first dataset, Figure 6 shows the FAR and FRR percentages when the
maximum of the similarity scores, which are calculated using Equation 2, is picked as
the acceptance threshold. As can be seen in this figure, our protocol achieves 0.57%
EER when the optimum acceptance threshold is 24.48. If the acceptance threshold is
selected as the average score of the system, the EER lies at 6.66% with 13.57 acceptance
threshold, as can be seen in Figure 8. On the other hand, if the acceptance threshold
is selected as the minimum score of the system as in Figure 10, the EER is 10% and
the acceptance threshold is 8.59.
Besides, for the second dataset, when the maximum of the similarity scores is picked
as the acceptance threshold, the system has 0.48% EER and the optimum acceptance
threshold is 25.49, as can be seen in Figure 7. Figure 9 shows the verification results,
when the average score is selected as the acceptance threshold. In this case, the system
reaches the EER of 2.61% with 15.06 acceptance threshold. Moreover, when the min-
imum score is selected as the acceptance threshold as in Figure 11, the EER is 19.4%
and the acceptance threshold is 6.13.
In Table 2, all of these EER values that are calculated according to the two different
predefined similarity score equations, for both datasets, are listed. The explained results
are summarized in this table as well. The EER values, obtained when the maximum
score of the system is selected, are quite sufficient for a secure biometric authentication
system.
27
Figure 6: Max scores picked as threshold
for the 1st dataset
Figure 7: Max scores picked as threshold
for the 2nd dataset
Figure 8: Avg scores picked as threshold
for the 1st dataset
Figure 9: Avg scores picked as threshold
for the 2nd dataset
Figure 10: Min scores picked as threshold
for the 1st dataset
Figure 11: Min scores picked as threshold
for the 2nd dataset
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Table 2: All EER Values
Equation Strategy 1st Dataset EER (%) 2nd Dataset EER (%)
Equation 1
min 10 19.86
max 0.57 0.55
avg 5 2.60
Equation 2
min 10 19.4
max 0.57 0.48
avg 6.66 2.61
5.3 Security Analyses
In this section, firstly our threat model is given. After that, the strength of our pro-
tocol against brute-force, replay and impersonation attacks are analysed. In addition,
the quality of the generated keys are also examined via entropy and Hamming distance
analyses.
5.3.1 Threat Model
The attacker’s main aim is twofold: (i) to impersonate a genuine user, and (ii) to
learn the key between the server and any victim user for eavesdropping purposes. We
do not assume a secure channel. Thus, the attacker can obtain all protocol messages
including the hash values and HMACs exchanged between the user and the server. Con-
sequently, the attacker learns the number of minutiae points used for the key agreement.
The attacker may apply brute-force attack in passive mode by making use of the ex-
changed messages and try to guess the key. Similarly, in order to impersonate a genuine
user, the attacker may apply a replay attack in active mode. However, our protocol
resists these type of attacks to some extent as discussed in the upcoming subsections.
29
5.3.2 Resistance Against Brute-Force Attacks
The attacker can always launch a brute-force attack by trying all possible key com-
binations. Since the key is 256 bits long, this attack is infeasible. However, in this
section, we will give a more intelligent brute-force attack by making use of the protocol
messages.
This attack is applied by generating all possible minutiae locations and types. In
the first dataset, one fingerprint can have at most 512 x and y values, because of the
sizes of the fingerprints in this database. A minutia can have two different types: end
or bifurcation. It means that the attacker must generate 512×512×2 = 219 points, and
hash them once and twice. In the second dataset, x and y coordinates of a fingerprint
are at most 850. Similarly, each minutia can be end or bifurcation. Thus, the attacker
must generate 850 × 850 × 2 =˜221 points, and hash them once and twice. Due to the
fact that the user sends the genuine and fake minutiae list, Qu, to the server, attacker’s
search space decreases to |Qu|, regardless of the datasets. However, our analysis shows
that this brute-force attack is still infeasible as discussed below.
The attacker has the list Qu and the number of minutiae with which the key is
generated, nkeycom. In order to find the generated key, the attacker should try all possible
subsets of the set Qu with size n
key
com, yielding the attack complexity attc (Equation 4).
attc =
(|Qu|
nkeycom
)
=
|Qu|!
nkeycom!× (|Qu| − nkeycom)!
(4)
For instance, if the user sends a list of 440 points, i.e. |Qu| = 440, in which 40 of
them are genuine, i.e. |Gu| = 40, and if the key agreement is completed with 16 common
minutiae, i.e. nkeycom = 16, then the attack complexity becomes
(
440
16
)
= 440!
16!×(440−16)!
∼= 296.
In order to calculate the overall attack complexity of the system, the combination
in Equation 4 is calculated after each key agreement. Then, we take the average of
the complexity results. The analysis shows that the average attack complexity of the
system with the first dataset is 94 bits (i.e. it requires 294 hash and HMAC verifica-
tions). On the other hand, for the second dataset, the attack complexity of the system
is 118 bits (i.e. it requires 2118 hash and HMAC verifications) on the average. As dis-
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cussed in [43], even with custom hardware implementation, computation of one block of
HMAC-SHA256 takes approximately 0.8977 microseconds. Thus, the above mentioned
complexities correspond to 5.6×1014 years of attack for the first dataset and 9.46×1021
years of attack for the second dataset. As a result, we can conclude that our protocol
efficiently resists intelligent brute-force attacks.
5.3.3 Resistance Against Replay Attack and Impersonation
The aim of replay attack is to impersonate a genuine user and get the legitimate key.
In order to do this, the attacker replays the previously exchanged messages between
the victim user and the server. The attacker needs to know the genuine minutiae
points to effectively calculate the generated key; otherwise, (s)he must try all possible
combinations out of Qu. Since the attacker does not know the genuine minutiae points,
the complexity of this attack becomes the same as that of the brute-force attack given
in Equation 4.
Moreover, the attacker may use his/her own fingerprint instead of the genuine user’s
fingerprint. The resistance of the protocol against this type of classical impersonation
attack is shown to be very low, since the FAR is 0.57% in the first dataset and 0.48%
in the second dataset. The readers should also note that such counterfeiting attacks
are general problems of all biometrics and related protocols; not specific to ours.
5.3.4 Randomness of the Generated Keys
In the first dataset, we generate 300 keys (30 subjects, 10 keys per subject). The
entropy values of these keys are given in Figure 12. Since each key is analysed one by
one, key ID in this figure indicates which key has which entropy value. The more the
entropy value approaches to 1, the more random the key is. In this case, approximately
84% of the keys have entropy values that are greater than 0.994, and also all of the keys
have entropy values that are greater than 0.98, which implies very good randomness.
It is important to note that these keys are generated by hashing the common minutiae.
It is an expected result to have high entropy for the hash results, because the hash
functions kind of randomize the input string. Therefore, the entropy values of the
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concatenation of common minutiae are calculated as well. The concatenation is as
follows, x||y||type. The entropy values of these concatenations are given in Figure 13.
Although the entropy values decrease a little, 92.30% of the keys have entropy value
above 0.98. Thus, they are still random enough.
In the second dataset, we generate 10220 keys (292 subjects, 35 keys per subject).
Figure 14 shows the entropy values of these keys. In the second dataset case, approx-
imately 99% of the keys have entropy values that are greater than 0.98, and also all
of the keys have entropy values that are greater than 0.94. These values are sufficient
for being a secure and random key. As mentioned before, these keys are generated
by hashing the common minutiae and their randomness can be as expected. For this
reason, the entropy values of the concatenation of common minutiae, x||y||type, are
calculated and given in Figure 15. Despite the fact that the entropy values decreases,
90.23% of the keys have entropy value above 0.96. Although there are some entropy
values around 0.78, it is normal to have such outliers in big datasets like ours. Hence,
their randomness is sufficient.
Figure 12: Entropy values of the generated keys for the 1st dataset
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Figure 13: Entropy values of the minutiae concatenations for the 1st dataset
Figure 14: Entropy values of the generated keys for the 2nd dataset
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Figure 15: Entropy values of the minutiae concatenations for the 2nd dataset
5.3.5 Distinctiveness of the Generated Keys
The fingerprints are time invariant biometrics. However, generating the same key
in each key agreement is undesirable, because compromise of a key should not risk the
confidentiality of the messages in other sessions. Thus, it is important to have a different
key in each key agreement. The minutiae quality and ordering change according to the
fingerprint scanner, pressure of the finger on the scanner, acquisition environment, etc.
This situation has both negative and positive effects on the key generation process. The
negative effect is the difficulty of agreement on the same key in a particular protocol
run. On the other hand, the positive effect is the generation of different keys in each
attempt.
In order to measure the difference of the keys for the same user, we calculate the
Hamming distances of the keys of the same user obtained after different protocol runs.
As can be seen in Figure 16, the average Hamming distances of the keys vary between
approximately 120-130 bits out of 256 bits for each user in the first dataset. Also the
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minimum difference is 97 bits. On the other hand, Figure 17 shows that the average
Hamming distance values of the keys are between 120-130 bits out of 256 bits for each
user in the second dataset. The minimum difference is 93 bits. These results show that
the users have distinct keys after each key agreement phase.
In addition to the same users’ keys comparison, we compare different users’ keys to
show that they are also different from each other. As can be seen in Figure 18, the
average Hamming distances of the keys that are generated for different users of the first
dataset vary between approximately 120-135 bits. Also, as can be seen in Figure 19,
the average Hamming distances of the different users’ keys are between 120-135 bits
for the second dataset. These values are very close to the average Hamming distances
of the same users’ keys. It means that we cannot decide if any two keys belong to the
same user or different users by looking at their similarities or differences.
Figure 16: Average Hamming distances of the same users’ keys for the 1st dataset
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Figure 17: Average Hamming distances of the same users’ keys for the 2nd dataset
Figure 18: Average Hamming distances of the different users’ keys for the 1st dataset
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Figure 19: Average Hamming distances of the different users’ keys for the 2nd dataset
5.4 Computational Complexity Analysis
Computational complexity of our protocol is calculated by adding up the number
of key generation attempts within the protocol run. This complexity is calculated from
user and server point of views separately.
The server generates only one key in the first round of the protocol. For the second
round of a given protocol run, the amount of key generations is the value of combination
of the number of common found minutiae minus one, ncom − 1, out of the number of
common found minutiae in the first round, ncom; i.e.,
(
ncom
ncom − 1
)
. In the upcoming
rounds, the server makes computations by selecting one less minutia each time out of
ncom. Thus, iterations stop when the correct key is generated, which contains n
key
com
minutiae points. The total server complexity, which is formalised in Equation 5, is the
sum of the number of all key generation attempts.
servercomplexity =
nkeycom∑
i=ncom
(
ncom
i
)
(5)
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The average server complexity, on the other hand, is the average of all attempts
taken against all subjects. This average case complexity analysis gives the server com-
plexity as 217 with the first dataset and 29 with the second dataset. These values are
quite sufficient for a real time application with small response time.
The user complexity for a protocol run is calculated in the following way. Due to
the fact that the server sends the number of common found minutiae, ncom, to the
user in the first round of the protocol, the user tries all possible subsets, whose size
is equal to ncom, of the genuine minutiae. Therefore, while calculating the complexity,
firstly the complexity of generating keys from all possible subsets is analysed. This
particular complexity is determined by the number of combinations of ncom out of the
number of genuine minutiae on the user side, nu; i.e.,
(
nu
ncom
)
. If the key cannot be
generated in the first round, the user continues the protocol by selecting subsets of
genuine minutiae with ncom− 1 elements out of nu. If the key is still not generated, the
user tries subsets of one less minutia points at each round, until the key is generated
or the user is rejected. According to this analysis, the total user complexity is the sum
of all key generation attempts from all subsets until the protocol stops. Equation 6
formalises the user complexity.
usercomplexity =
nkeycom∑
i=ncom
(
nu
i
)
(6)
The user complexity is calculated for all user tests and then they are averaged. The
analysis shows that the average user complexity is 239 in the first dataset and 241 in
the second dataset. Although these values seem to be high, it is the cost of not using
any helper data. If we ever used any helper data, it might be easier to agree on the
common parts of the biometric. However, this would introduce some other problems,
such as the distribution of this helper data, risk of compromise and information leakage
to the attacker.
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5.5 Communication Complexity Analysis
Communication complexity of the protocol is measured according to the number of
bits exchanged between the user and the server. The protocol starts with the message
sent by the user to the server. This message contains the user ID and the genuine
and fake minutiae set, Qu. User ID is a 32-bit integer; whereas Qu consists of 256-
bit hash results. Average number of elements in Qu is 440 for the first dataset, and
550 for the second dataset. Since all of them are 256-bit hash values, 440 points
correspond to 256 × 440 = 112640 bits. Considering the second dataset, this number
becomes 256 × 550 = 140800 bits. As a result, the total communication cost of the
first message is 32 + 112640 = 112672 bits = 13.75 KB for the first dataset. On the
other hand, for the second dataset, the total communication cost of the first message
is 32 + 140800 = 140832 bits = 17.2 KB.
The second message of the protocol is sent by the server. This message is either a
negative acknowledgement which indicates that the user is rejected, or the number of
common found minutiae and an HMAC value. Negative acknowledgment is just 1-bit.
If the user is not rejected, the message contains 32-bit integer which is the number of
common found minutiae, and a 256-bit value which is the HMAC result. Hence, the
total cost of communication for this message is 256 + 32 = 288 bits = 36 bytes.
The protocol continues with the message sent by the user. This message is either
ACCEPT or RETRY. Either one of them can be represented by 1-bit; ACCEPT with
1, RETRY with 0. If the protocol continues with RETRY message, the server sends
either a negative acknowledgment or a list of HMAC values. Negative acknowledgment
is 1-bit. The number of elements in the HMAC values list is equal to
(
ncom
ncom − 1
)
, where
ncom is the total number of common found minutiae. In both datasets, the average
number of common minutiae found by the server, ncom, is 24. Hence, the average cost
of the message which consist of HMAC values is 256×
(
24
23
)
= 6144 bits = 768 bytes.
After that, if the user cannot verify any HMAC value, the user sends a RETRY
message represented by 1-bit. Otherwise, the user sends a positive acknowledgment
with the index of the HMAC value which is verified. Positive acknowledgment is 1-bit,
and the index is a 32-bit integer. Thus, the cost of this message is 1 + 32 = 33 bits.
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In the next steps of the protocol, the total communication cost of the messages sent
by the user does not change. However, the cost of the messages sent by the server
changes as
(
ncom
x
)
, where x = ncom − 2, ncom − 3, ... , nkeycom, and nkeycom is the number
of minutiae used in the correct key generation. Thus, the communication cost changes
at each round until the key is generated. The average number of minutiae with which
the key is generated is 16 for the first dataset. Hence, the maximum cost of an HMAC
list message is 256 ×
(
24
16
)
= 188280576 bits = 22.4 MB. For the second dataset, the
average number of minutiae in the key generation case is 20. Thus, the maximum cost
of a message sent by the server is 256×
(
24
20
)
= 2720256 bits = 332.1 KB.
Total size of the messages sent by the server is approximately 22.4 MB for the first
dataset and 332.8 KB for the second dataset. On the other hand, total communication
cost of the messages sent by the users is approximately 13.75 KB for the first dataset
and 17.2 KB for the second dataset. All of the communication costs given above are
quite reasonable given today’s Internet speeds.
5.6 Memory Requirements Analysis
Considering the first dataset, on the server side, the average minutiae count of the
subjects is 42. In addition to the original minutiae, the points in the Tdist-neighborhood
are also stored in the server. In the tests, we take Tdist as 10. As a result, each original
minutiae is represented with 21 × 21 = 441 points. On the average, 42 × 441 = 18522
points are stored by the server for each subject. These points are hashed values and
each is 256 bits long. In total, each subject’s template is 578.8 KB. For 30 subjects, the
server needs 16.9 MB of storage in total. These values correspond to the case that the
server stores only the single hashes of the points. At the verification stage, the server
may calculate the double hashes or it may store them as well. If the server stores the
double hashes, the storage need is doubled.
On the user side, average minutiae count of the subjects is 40. The user does not
calculate the neighboring points. Therefore, the user needs 1.25 KB of storage for
hash values of the minutiae. Since the user calculates double hashes as well, the needed
storage is 2.5 KB. In addition, the user calculates 10×|Gu| fake points. On the average,
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each user calculates 400 fake points. They cost of 12.5 KB of storage. As a result, the
total needed storage is 12.5 + 2.5 = 15 KB for a user in the first dataset.
If we take the second dataset into account, the average number of minutiae on the
server side is 51. Together with the points in the Tdist-neighborhood, the total number
of points is 51 × 441 = 22491. This number of points corresponds to 702.8 KB of
storage. Total storage needed for 292 subjects is approximately 200 MB. When the
double hashes is calculated at the verification stage, the storage need doubles for a
particular subject.
With regard to the memory requirement of the user, we calculate the average number
of minutiae of the users in the second dataset as 50. Thus, the user needs 1.56 KB of
memory to store hash values of these minutiae. However, the user calculates also the
double hashes and the storage need becomes 3.12 KB. In addition, 10×|Gu| fake points
are generated and these will cost 15.63 KB of storage. As a result, 3.12 + 15.63 = 18.75
KB of storage is needed in total.
All of the memory requirements given above are in acceptable limits. They can
easily fit into the memories of current technology devices.
5.7 Comparative Analysis with the Related Work
Since our protocol works with unordered biometrics, the best method to be com-
pared with our protocol is the fuzzy vault. Fuzzy vault is applied to the unordered set
of biometric features and it is a highly accepted method for key binding. To the best
of our knowledge, almost all fuzzy vault works in the literature do some improvements
on the quality of the biometric features, because fuzzy vault requires exactly the same
feature points when reconstructing the polynomial. Therefore, we analyse the perfor-
mance of fuzzy vault by utilizing our quantization and most reliable minutiae selection
methods. By doing so, we aim to strike a balance between our protocol and the fuzzy
vault.
In Table 3, FAR and FRR percentages of the fuzzy vault method, when it is applied
to our datasets, can be seen. Different polynomial degrees imply different key lengths.
Since we can represent x and y coordinates of the fingerprints with 10 bit values in both
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datasets, we have 20 bit abscissa values when we concatenate them for the fuzzy vault.
As a result, a key of length 160 bits can be hidden into a degree 7 polynomial with 8
(= 160/20) coefficients. Similarly, 180 bits of secret correspond to a polynomial with
degree 8 and 9 (= 180/20) coefficients. Same rule can be applied for degree 9, 10, 11
and 12 polynomials as well. Since our protocol generates 256 bit keys, it is appropriate
to compare our results with a fuzzy vault of degree 11 and degree 12 polynomials.
The fuzzy vault with a polynomial with degree 11 requires at least 12 common
minutiae to reconstruct the polynomial successfully. If a genuine user and the server
agree on less than 12 points, the user is rejected and this is counted as false reject. On
the other hand, if an impostor user and the server can find more than 11 minutiae in
common, the impostor subject is accepted and this is counted as false accept. With
this method of calculation, a fuzzy vault with degree 11 polynomial has 0.06% FAR
and 40.33% FRR for the first dataset. Our method achieves 0.57% EER with the same
dataset. In terms of FAR, the fuzzy vault is better than our protocol; however, FRR
of the fuzzy vault makes it impractical to be used in real world applications. For the
second dataset, a fuzzy vault with a degree 11 polynomial yields 0.80% FAR and 31.33%
FRR. Both of the percentages are worse than our protocol’s 0.48% EER. The results
are similar with degree 12 polynomial as well. Although, the fuzzy vault obtains 0.02%
FAR for the first dataset, its FRR is 46.33%. In other words, almost the half of the
genuine users are rejected with this method. Similarly, the fuzzy vault, applied to the
second dataset, results in 0.38% FAR and 34.53% FRR. Despite the better FAR, our
protocol outperforms fuzzy vault in terms of FRR, because 34.53% FRR is unacceptable
in any application.
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Table 3: FAR and FRR Values of Fuzzy Vault
Dataset Polynomial degree Key length (bits) FAR (%) FRR (%)
1st dataset
7 160 4.55 19.67
8 180 1.83 28.33
9 200 0.65 34.33
10 220 0.19 37.67
11 240 0 .06 40 .33
12 260 0 .02 46 .33
2nd dataset
7 160 10.64 17.31
8 180 5.91 20.81
9 200 3.14 24.60
10 220 1.62 28.20
11 240 0 .8 31 .33
12 260 0 .38 34 .53
We also compare our protocol with the fuzzy vault, in terms of brute-force attack
complexity. We already mentioned how we measure our protocol’s attack complexity.
We follow a similar approach while calculating the attack complexity of the fuzzy vault.
In order to reconstruct the polynomial with degree d, the attacker must try all possible
subsets with size d + 1 of the whole set including genuine and fake minutiae, Qu. It
is known that in the first dataset the average number of minutiae on the user side is
40. Together with the fake minutiae, the total number of points becomes 440. Thus,
the attacker must try to interpolate
(
440
12
)
polynomials, which is yielding a complexity
of 277. Moreover, with a degree 12 polynomial, the attacker must reconstruct
(
440
13
)
polynomials. Hence, in this case, the attack complexity is 282. As we mentioned
before, our protocol has the attack complexity of 294 hash and HMAC verifications for
the first dataset. Our protocol’s attack complexity is larger than both of them. In
addition, the total number of genuine and fake points in the second dataset is 550 and
our protocol’s attack complexity is 2118 hash and HMAC verifications. However, with a
degree 11 polynomial, the attack complexity of the fuzzy vault is
(
550
12
)
= 281 polynomial
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reconstructions for the second dataset. Moreover, with a degree 12 polynomial, the
fuzzy vault attack complexity becomes
(
550
13
)
= 286. None of the fuzzy vault attack
complexities is better than ours. As a result, we can conclude that our protocol’s
resistance against brute-force attacks is stronger than that of the fuzzy vault despite
the user side computational complexity overhead of the proposed protocol.
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6 Conclusions
In this thesis, we proposed a novel secure key agreement protocol using unordered
feature sets of biometric traits. This protocol is exemplified using the fingerprint bio-
metrics. The key is generated by making use of minutiae points in the fingerprint; no
random data is used while generating the key. This way, the user is strictly bound to
the cryptographic key. Moreover, there is no need to store any helper or random data
other than the biometric template of the user at the server side.
Our system uses hash functions and threshold mechanisms while generating the keys.
In addition, we carefully designed a fake minutiae generation strategy such that the fake
minutiae hide the genuine minutiae without being confused with the genuine minutiae.
For this purpose, we defined the concept of neighborhood relation. With the help of the
neighborhood relation, the fake minutiae increases the verification performance of the
system while not leaking any information to the attacker.
We analysed the security performance of our protocol in different aspects and with
two different datasets. Our results showed verification performance of 0.57% EER for
the first dataset and 0.48% EER for the second dataset. The resistance of our protocol
against intelligent brute-force, replay and impersonation attacks was also analysed.
Such attacks require 294 and 2118 trials on the average for first and second datasets,
respectively, which was shown to provide good computational security. In addition,
we employed entropy-based randomness analyses of the agreed keys. Our analyses
showed that approximately 84% of the keys’ entropy values are above 0.994 and all of
the keys’ entropy values are above 0.98 in the first dataset. Similarly, in the second
dataset, 99% of the keys have entropy values that are greater than 0.98, and almost
all of the keys has entropy values that are greater than 0.96. Both of the results
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imply that the keys are random enough to be used as cryptographic keys. Besides, the
distinctiveness of the generated keys was measured using the Hamming distance metric.
Our Hamming distance-based analyses showed that the same users’ and different users’
keys are quite indistinguishable from each other, regardless of the dataset. In terms
of computational complexity, the server side operations took approximately 29 and
217 hash and HMAC calculations, and the user side operations took approximately
239 and 241 hash and HMAC calculations for first and second datasets, respectively.
Although the user side complexity seem to be high, it is actually a trade-off between
using and not using any helper data to ease the agreement on the feature points in the
key generation process. Using a helper data leads to the necessity of new precautions
to avoid compromise of this helper data. Besides, the communication complexity and
the memory requirements of the system are acceptable for implementing the protocol
according to today’s technology.
Apart from the performance and security evaluation of the proposed protocol, a
comparative analysis with an existing work (fuzzy vault) was also performed. Our
analyses showed that our protocol outperforms the fuzzy vault in terms of both verifi-
cation performance and attack complexity point of views. However, the computational
complexity of the user side operations in our protocol is high and this fact should be
considered.
As a future work, template renewal process can be designed on the server side.
In other words, templates can be arranged as cancelable biometrics. Moreover, our
protocol can be adopted to other biometrics with ordered set of features, such as the
iris biometrics.
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